Russia, Iran alliance under strain amid Ukraine and West Asia wars

Russia and Iran’s long and often uneasy relationship is facing renewed scrutiny amid the wars in Ukraine and West Asia, with analysts questioning the durability of their strategic partnership.

In a report published by Al Jazeera, experts said the alliance between Moscow and Tehran has largely been driven by shared geopolitical interests rather than deep mutual trust.

The report traced tensions between the two countries back nearly two centuries, including the killing of Russian diplomat Aleksander Griboyedov in Tehran in 1829 following Russia’s growing influence in Persia after the Russia-Persian war.

Despite historical mistrust, ties between the two countries improved after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as Russia increasingly viewed Iran as a key ally in maintaining influence in West Asia.

Over the years, Moscow supplied Tehran with weapons, supported Iran diplomatically at the United Nations, and cooperated on energy and infrastructure projects, including nuclear power development.

The alliance strengthened further in 2015 when Russia and Iran intervened to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during Syria’s civil war.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran moved closer to Moscow by supplying Shahed drones, ammunition and military equipment, according to the report.

However, analysts cited by Al Jazeera said the partnership remains fragile.

“It is fair to describe the relationship between Russia and Iran as a marriage of convenience rather than a formal alliance,” the report quoted Seyed Ali Alavi, a lecturer in Middle Eastern and Iranian Studies at the University of London, as saying.

The report said Russia has maintained ties with Iran’s regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, while also competing with Tehran in oil exports to China.

Analysts also suggested Moscow could be willing to scale back support for Iran if it secures concessions from the West over Ukraine.

Still, experts believe Russia’s influence in the ongoing Iran crisis appears limited, especially after Pakistan -- not Moscow -- was chosen to mediate talks involving the US, Israel and Iran.

The report said the development reflects declining trust in Russia’s role as an international mediator following its actions in Ukraine.

Imperial Scars and Historical Grievances

The historical friction between Moscow and Tehran traces back nearly two centuries.

In February 1829, Aleksander Griboyedov, a tsarist-era ambassador to Persia, was killed in Tehran after refusing to hand over fugitives seeking refuge under the Treaty of Turkmenchay.

The anti-Russian riot followed a devastating war that forced Persia to cede territories in the South Caucasus -- including parts of modern Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia -- and pay a massive indemnity of 20 million silver rubles, which bled the Persian economy dry.

For the remainder of the 19th and 20th centuries, Russia repeatedly intervened in Iranian affairs.

Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran's new theocratic government initially dubbed the officially atheist Soviet Union “the little Satan”, a term usually reserved for Israel.

The relationship shifted after the 1991 Soviet collapse.

No longer fearing Russian expansionism, Tehran became a crucial partner for Moscow to maintain Middle Eastern influence.

Russia used its UN Security Council veto power to block international sanctions, while Tehran spent billions on Russian weaponry and nuclear development, including the Rosatom-built Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Pragmatism Over True Alliance

Despite recent diplomatic overtures, experts emphasize that deep structural mistrust remains.

“The main reason they’re coming closer is exclusively pragmatism considering their isolation,” Nikita Smagin, an expert on Russia-Iran ties, told Al Jazeera.

“They don’t like each other.” Smagin added that “Historically, Iranians have nothing but negative [memories] about Russia,” and even conservative domestic media warn that Moscow cannot be trusted.

What binds them is a shared geopolitical adversary. “What unites them is a common enemy or a common geopolitical challenge,” said Volodymyr Fesenko, head of the Penta Center.

“That’s what this friendship against America is about, ideologically and geopolitically.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin has called these relations a strategic priority, stating in 2024 that “Our ties are simply those of allies” during a summit for BRICS, an emerging economies bloc that Iran formally joined in early 2024.

Divergent Interests and Strategic Limits

The limitations of the partnership are reflected in Moscow’s reluctance to sign a mutual defence pact. Russia has carefully maintained its relationships with Iran's primary regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel.

Moscow and Tehran also remain direct competitors in exporting discounted crude oil to China.

The partnership peaked significantly following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Moving away from initial neutrality, Iran provided crucial military support to Moscow, supplying modified Shahed drones, ammunition, and body armour.

In return, Moscow provided Tehran with advanced satellite navigation modules and intelligence data from its Liana spy satellite system to monitor US military movements in the Middle East.

However, the direct limits of this alliance became apparent during severe US and Israeli military strikes against Iran.

While Moscow officially condemned the attacks, Putin never considered deploying troops to aid Tehran.

“This situation is a blow to Putin’s image that yet again shows that he is incapable of really helping his partners, his allies,” noted Ruslan Suleymanov, an associate fellow at the New Eurasian Strategies Center.

Some analysts argue the Kremlin would gladly trade its relationship with Iran for major Western concessions on Ukraine, though such a deal remains highly improbable due to European opposition.

Ultimately, Russia’s exclusion from mediating the Middle East crisis -- with Pakistan chosen instead -- highlights Moscow’s depleted diplomatic currency and the fundamental deficit of international trust following its breach of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in Ukraine.