Iftekharuzzaman, the executive director of Transparency International Bangladesh, who also headed the anti-corruption reform commission and was a member of the national consensus commission, has talked about his disappointment over the non-execution of crucial reforms during the tenure of the interim government of Muhammad Yunus with Sadiqur Rahman in an interview with New Age
New Age: How do you assess the trend of corruption before and after the July 2024 uprising? Has there been any real change?
Iftekharuzzaman: We must begin by recognising that Bangladesh has come out of the 16-year authoritarian rule, in which a kleptocratic system became deeply entrenched in the country. This did not happen overnight. It evolved over time but reached its most consolidated form during that period.
Corruption was both a core feature and a driving force, manifested in the abuse of power, the protection of looters in power, and the systematic dismantling of anti-corruption mechanisms. Institutions were captured, laws were framed and misused to shield corruption and the state was gradually taken over. Ultimately, the key levers of governance fell into the hands of a kleptocracy.
The anti-discrimination movement, the student–mass uprising, and the July uprising were reactions to this situation. Corruption lay at the heart of structural inequality. The vision of a new Bangladesh that emerged after the fall of the Awami League regime was one of a state accountable to its citizens, transparent in its functioning, and serious about preventing corruption. The interim government assumed office with three stated priorities: justice, state reform and elections.
Central to state reform was the need to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Commission. Six reform commissions were set up, with the one on the anti-corruption reforms having been high on the agenda.
In the reform commission report and later in discussions at the national consensus commission, the core question was how to ensure executive accountability. Institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the administration, law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary, the pillars of the state, must function independently if the executive is to be held accountable. That framework exists on paper, in the July National Charter and in multiple reform reports.
The question is: how far have we progressed? It’s still too early to make a statistical comparison of corruption before and after July 2024. We don’t yet have credible data in this regard. What we can say is that immediately after the Hasina regime fell on the afternoon of August 5, 2024, we saw widespread attempts to capture political and governance spaces, through partisan dominance, land grabbing, extortion, false cases, arrests, and bail manipulation.
One defeated force retreated, but another quickly moved in to fill the vacuum. As a result, the foundations for meaningful anti-corruption reform were unstable from the outset.
This was reflected not only in the political sphere but also inside institutions. In the bureaucracy, we witnessed hurried appointments and promotions driven by a familiar ‘rationale’: ‘We were sidelined before; now it’s our turn.’ The same mindset spread across the governance system.
The government had a responsibility to resist this mindset and the actions that followed it It failed to do so. Although reform commissions were formed by executive orders and genuine possibilities for change existed, implementation has been negligible. After submitting our reports, the interim government asked each commission, including the reform commission, to identify recommendations that could be implemented within its tenure. We did so.
Yet, to my knowledge, almost none of those actionable recommendations have been meaningfully put to use. A few symbolic, selective steps were taken, but these fell far short of what was required. Even where legal reforms have been effected, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission Ordinance 2025, they contain serious structural weaknesses. Most ordinances issued under the interim government undermine, rather than advance, the core objectives of reform and state restructuring.
A clear example is our proposal to establish independent selection and review committees for the Anti-Corruption Commission to ensure accountability without compromising independence. After extensive discussions, including a direct engagement with me as head of the commission, the government agreed on November 19, 2024, that this was a critical reform. The only suggested modification was to split it into two provisions instead of one. We accepted that and returned hopeful, only to find that the provision had been dropped entirely.
The fundamental problem is the resistance from within the state. The single greatest obstacle to an effective anti-corruption system is the bureaucracy. Entrenched bureaucratic interests exert pressure on the executive, the advisory council, to secure decisions favourable to them. Those decisions then receive formal approval, weakening the prospects of building a durable anti-corruption framework that a future elected government could have carried forward.
New Age: Transparency International Bangladesh has criticised the Anti-Corruption Commission Ordinance, particularly the provision allowing the Jatiya Sangsad speaker, rather than the opposition leader, to nominate a member of the selection committee. The July charter listed 15 Anti-Corruption Commission-related reforms that could be implemented through ordinances, all supported by 32 political parties without dissent.
Iftekharuzzaman: It is deeply painful that not a single reform of those 15 items has been implemented. The selection and review committees were explicitly included in the July charter, with no dissent from any party. The government was fully aware of this; we reminded it repeatedly. Yet the provision was still dropped.
The resistance originated from within the government, primarily the bureaucracy. Large-scale corruption in Bangladesh, whether public or private, cannot occur without bureaucratic collusion. Naturally, the bureaucracy wants to keep institutions like the ACC under its influence. Through this influence, cabinet-level decisions are shaped. I have heard from reliable sources that at least seven advisers supported the final decision to drop the provision. That is extremely unfortunate.
New Age: The anti-corruption reform commission proposed a six-, 18- and 48-month road maps. Within six months, mandatory pre-investigation inquiries were to be abolished, with an independent internal discipline unit being established and special courts set up in the ACC districts. None of this happened.
Iftekharuzzaman: That is correct. Mandatory inquiries were abolished only at the central level, not in the field offices. While this is a limited positive step, it is insignificant compared to the strategic reforms that were ignored.
There was also resistance from within the Anti-Corruption Commission. I say this with disappointment. The Anti-Corruption Commission chair personally discussed the report with me and raised no substantive objections. Yet institutional resistance emerged, particularly against the selection and review committees.
The Anti-Corruption Commission suffers from corruption. This is not merely a media allegation; it is also acknowledged by the commission. There are credible reports of Anti-Corruption Commission officials maintaining relationships with individuals under investigation. Our long-standing research has indicated this while the reform process has confirmed it.
We recommended identifying officials facing credible allegations, removing them from service, and putting them to legal process. To our knowledge, nothing substantive has occurred beyond a few temporary suspensions.
We also proposed dismantling the internal anti-corruption committee and establishing an independent disciplinary unit. That has not happened either. While political influence is often discussed, bureaucratic dominance is equally decisive. Most senior Anti-Corruption Commission officials are deputed from the administrative bureaucracy, which effectively acts as a gatekeeper, determining who will be investigated and who will not. This is why the Anti-Corruption Commission has consistently failed to function as an effective watchdog.
We proposed gradually reducing bureaucratic dominance, capping it at 10 per cent in senior positions. The Anti-Corruption Commission agreed in principle, and all political parties supported it without reservation. Yet it was not reflected in law. That is deeply discouraging.
New Age: Another unanimous proposal was for Bangladesh to join the common reporting standard to curb money laundering.
Iftekharuzzaman: This is a critically important reform. Under the common reporting standard, overseas financial transactions of Bangladeshi citizens become accessible to oversight bodies in near-real time. More than 120 countries have adopted it. Bangladesh has not.
Resistance comes from institutions such as National Board of Revenue and others. The common reporting standard would expose systemic plunder in the banking and financial sectors, much of it driven by trade misinvoicing. Yet there is no serious initiative from either the government or the Anti-Corruption Commission.
Corruption can’t be controlled by the Anti-Corruption Commission alone. Every institution — the bureaucracy, the police, the Armed Forces, the intelligence agencies or the Bangladesh Bank — has a role to play in this regard.
That was why we proposed a National Anti-Corruption Strategy, with defined mandates, assigned responsibilities, and independent oversight through an ombudsman. One adviser dismissed the idea, arguing that strategies are meaningless in a country where laws are ignored. That mindset explains much of the problem.
New Age: The Anti-Corruption Commission is currently a statutory body. There is a proposal to make it a constitutional institution, but the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the allied parties opposed incorporating the appointment process into the constitution. How do you see the future of this reform?
Iftekharuzzaman: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the allied parties have effectively rejected the idea of making the Anti-Corruption Commission a constitutional body. Throughout the consensus-making process, their position was clear: do not bind the government’s hands. As a result, proposals aimed at ensuring executive accountability, including constitutional status for the Anti-Corruption Commission, were unacceptable to them. Regardless of any referendum outcome, I don’t believe this reform will materialise if these parties come to power.
New Age: The 13th Jatiya Sangsad elections will be the first after the July uprising. Affidavits show unexplained wealth, including assets held by spouses with no declared income. How do you see this?
Iftekharuzzaman: Many so-called July leaders and organisers abandoned the promise of a new political settlement and surrendered to the old order. Some became involved in the very practices like partisanship, extortion, and irregularities that they once opposed. Corruption even shaped the evolution of new political entities. It was self-defeating.
We talk about reform everywhere except where it matters most: political parties.
Politics requires resources, but the essential question is where the money comes from, whether it is legal, and who accounts for it. Today, political capital is defined by money, muscle, and the instrumental use of religion. This fuels political criminalisation. The prospect of a genuinely new political settlement, in my view, is steadily fading.
New Age: You once said that you were hopeful. Where does that hope stand now?
Iftekharuzzaman: The interim government squandered a historic opportunity. Take the police commission proposal. It risks becoming a rehabilitation platform for retired police officers and bureaucrats rather than an independent oversight body. Similar distortions are evident elsewhere.
Yet, I have not abandoned my hope. The July charter and the July uprising remain alive in public memory. People will ask politicians: why was there no state reform? Why is no new political settlement there? That public demand is where my hope lies.