THE draft amendment to the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004 raises serious concerns about the autonomy and the future of the country’s anti-corruption watchdog. Instead of strengthening an institution that has for long struggled with political interference, the proposed changes appear designed to weaken its independence further and place it under greater bureaucratic control. The most alarming proposal would empower the ACC secretary, a government-appointed bureaucrat, to exercise the powers of the chairman and commissioners whenever the commission remains vacant. That the ACC itself prepared the draft at a time when it is functioning without a chairman or commissioners and, in practice, being run by bureaucrats makes the matter particularly troubling. The proposed amendment carries the risk of institutionalising this abnormal arrangement. Allowing a government-appointed secretary to take decisions that should belong exclusively to an independent commission undermines the very rationale for the existence of the ACC. It would create a dangerous incentive, and give legal basis, to delay commissioner appointments while allowing the bureaucracy to exercise authority over corruption investigations. Such a provision would effectively transform the autonomous statutory body into an administrative extension of the executive branch, eroding public confidence in its neutrality and credibility.
A number of other proposed amendments are also troubling. The draft seeks to repeal Section 21, which currently empowers ACC officials, with court approval, to arrest individuals suspected of possessing unexplained wealth. It also proposes abolishing the mandatory requirement to complete investigations within 120 days, a provision intended to ensure accountability and prevent undue delays. While some provisions in the draft deserve consideration, including expanding the ACC’s jurisdiction over a wider range of financial crimes and removing legal obstacles that previously protected public officials from prosecution, these positive elements are overshadowed by provisions that could weaken institutional accountability. The proposal to reduce the tenure of the chairman and commissioners from five years to four years is also concerning, as it risks making the leadership more vulnerable to political pressure. What is particularly suspicious and unacceptable is that, after allowing an ordinance drafted under the interim administration to strengthen the ACC’s autonomy and effectiveness to lapse, and after keeping the institution headless and operationally paralysed, the government has sought the commission’s recommendations on amendments to the law. A bureaucracy-led commission has subsequently prepared the draft without any stakeholder consultation.
The government should, therefore, reject any amendment that compromises the ACC’s independence and demonstrate a genuine commitment to fighting corruption. The immediate priority should be the appointment of competent and credible commissioners through a transparent process. Any legal reform must strengthen, not dilute, the institutional safeguards that protect the commission from executive influence. The battle against corruption cannot be won by weakening the very institution entrusted with leading that fight.