THE suggested modifications to the Anti-Corruption Commission Act are creating significant concerns regarding the future ability of the anti-corruption agency of the nation to operate independently. While some suggestions are made with the purpose of widening the jurisdiction of the commission, others have the potential to compromise institutional safeguards critical for the functioning of the Anti-Corruption Commission.
The most controversial part of the new legislation is the provision that enables the ACC secretary to undertake the role of the commission in case there is a vacancy in the positions of chairman and commissioners. In its attempt to justify the decision to allow such practice, the government claims the necessity of such measures because of the current vacancy situation at the commission. It, however, should be noted that no matter what reason exists, it cannot override the importance of institutional independence.
The ACC, by definition, represents an autonomous statutory organisation created to ensure that anti-corruption investigations are conducted independently from any external intervention. The position of the secretary of the commission, no matter who holds it, is the post of a civil servant nominated by the government. Thus, assigning the functions of the commission to an appointed bureaucrat will undermine the initial purpose of creating the commission as an independent entity. The provision is causing another problem since, having the power, the commission might no longer be compelled to fill in the vacancies in order to continue to operate.
Indeed, the amendment seems to be in contrast with the recommendation made by the Anti-Corruption Commission formed after the July uprising. The reform commission recommended measures that would increase the autonomy of the ACC. In addition, one of the main recommendations was to recognise the ACC as a constitutional body, thereby ensuring that it will not face any kind of executive pressure in the discharge of its responsibilities.
In line with this recommendation, the July Charter suggested having a constitutionally guaranteed independent anti-corruption commission which will not have to face political or bureaucratic pressures. In other words, there was widespread agreement among all political forces on the need to strengthen the state institutions accountable for the maintenance of proper conduct by government officials.
The amendment being proposed here, on the other hand, works contrary to what was agreed upon then. Instead of working towards making the anti-corruption body free from bureaucratic pressures, it seems to give more authority to a bureaucrat appointed by the executive. Moreover, the amendment makes it possible for the executive to exercise more power during a vacancy in the office.
The proposed reform is thus contradictory to the commitments made by political parties since the fall of the previous government. As per the reforms announced by the BNP, there will be institutional reforms to ensure transparency and accountability, while there will be an uncompromising attitude towards corruption.
Of course, there are clauses in the amendment bill which can empower the ACC in some ways, especially its jurisdiction over matters of fraud, forgery, offences related to taxes and customs, stock market manipulations and some types of money laundering. This should definitely be taken into account.
However, it should be kept in mind that effective operation of any agency or organisation depends not only on its authority but also on its independence. No matter how many powers an anti-corruption agency may have, it would find it difficult to perform effectively if it lacked such independence. Practice shows that any anti-corruption agency performs best under conditions where it is completely independent of political and bureaucratic influences.
Moreover, there are concerns about some other changes being made in the process of amending the ACC law, such as repeal of the special powers of the agency in cases of unexplained wealth and elimination of the deadline for completion of investigation of cases. While such changes are sometimes justifiable, they need careful assessment because otherwise, there might be negative consequences.
The issue acquires extra importance in the light of the situation in the country after the events of July. One of the reasons behind the popular uprising that led to the formation of the new government in Bangladesh has been resentment against corruption, abuses of power and capture of the country’s institutions by vested interests. All research and discussions that have been taking place ever since have revealed corruption and lack of accountability as primary causes of people’s frustration. What the people demanded as a result was not just change in government but the creation of strong and accountable institutions.
Consequently, the government should think twice about this particular amendment and in particular about the proposal for transferring the power of the whole commission to its secretary. Instead, the government should take steps to fill the vacancies in the commission as quickly as possible through a transparent procedure. At the same time, the government should work to implement the recommendations made by the concerned commission and commitments undertaken by the July Charter.
The BNP should not do anything that allows critics to say, ‘Awami League never showed such audacity.’ Protecting the ACC’s autonomy is essential to demonstrating zero tolerance for corruption and to preventing a renewed crisis of public trust.
Bangladesh needs a more powerful ACC. However, any attempts at enhancing its effectiveness by giving the agency more bureaucratic powers might be counterproductive in the circumstances.
Ahammad Foyez is managing editor at New Age.